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In this fMRI study, we investigated theory of mind (ToM) in patients with paranoid schizophrenia. We hypothesized that the
network supporting the representation of intentions is dysfunctional in patients with schizophrenia dependent on the type of
intention involved. We used a paradigm including a control condition (physical causation) and three intention conditions (private
intention, prospective social intention and communicative intentions) differing in the degree of social interaction. In all four
experimental conditions patients performed worse than controls regarding accuracy and reaction time. They showed significantly
less activation in three regions typically activated in ToM tasks, i.e. paracingulate cortex and bilateral temporo-parietal junctions.
However, this dysfunction was dependent on the type of intention represented, i.e. was present only for social but not for non-
social intentions. Moreover, part of the reduced activation was related to the fact that there was no signal drop in these regions
for the physical causality condition as usually found in controls. This may be due to the tendency of schizophrenic patients
to attribute intentionality to physical objects. Our findings have implications for the study and understanding of ToM in
schizophrenia but also in other disorders like autism.
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INTRODUCTION
Theory of mind (ToM), sometimes also referred to as
‘mind reading’ or ‘mentalizing’, is the cognitive ability to
understand others as intentional agents by inferring and
thereby representing their mental states (Premack and
Woodruff, 1978; Baron-Cohen, 1995; Frith, 2004). From
an evolutionary point of view such an ability is a selective
adaptation to an increasingly complex social environment
helping to explain and predict behaviour in others and is
linked to successful social interaction (Brothers, 1990;
Dunbar, 1998). Functional imaging studies in healthy con-
trols have shown four key regions involved in ToM: The
medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), the posterior cingulate
cortex/precuneus and bilateral temporo-parietal regions
(Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Saxe, 2006; Ciaramidaro et al.,
2007), which we will call the ToM network. The prominent
view is that the most specific structure for mentalizing is a
subregion of the MPFC, the paracingulate cortex (Gallagher
and Frith, 2003; Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith and Frith,
2006), although it has recently been argued that this role
should be attributed to the right temporo-parietal junction
(TPJ) (Saxe, 2006). These apparently inconsistent findings
can be explained by the fact that different nodes of the ToM
network are modulated by different types of intentional
states (Ciaramidaro et al., 2007): Using cartoons we found
activation of the posterior cingulate cortex and right TPJ
suffices to solve tasks involving private intentions (PInt),
i.e. intentions of a single agent directed at objects, whereas
the MPFC is necessary when social interaction is prospective
(PSInt), i.e. intention of one agent (A) preparing to interact
with B (who is not actually present), or here and now,
i.e. communicative intention (CInt) (Bara, 2008) involving
two people actually interacting. This last condition is also
the only one that recruited all four areas described above
(Walter et al., 2004).
Impairment in ToM has been implicated in various
psychiatric disorders like autism (Baron-Cohen, 1995),
frontotemporal dementia (Gregory et al., 2002), depression
(Hynes et al., 2006), brain lesions of the ToM-network
(Rowe and Passingham, 2001; Stuss et al., 2001; Stone
et al., 2003; Apperly et al., 2004) and schizophrenia
(Bru¨ne, 2005). Schizophrenia is a heterogeneous disorder
with various symptom subgroups showing different degrees
of mentalizing impairment and this deficit seems to depend
on their psychopathology (disorganized > paranoid >
patients with passivity phenomena) (Corcoran et al., 1997;
Pickup and Frith, 2001; Sprong et al., 2007). Frith (1992)
proposed that certain psychotic symptoms associated with
schizophrenia reflect a deficit in the ability of mentalizing
and claims that this is the result of a failure of patients to
monitor their own and others’ mental states and behaviour.
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This deficit might have different reasons: While disorganized
patients lack the basic capability to represent mental states
at all, patients with paranoid symptoms still have this com-
petence but use it inappropriately.
However, not only reduced ToM ability is maladaptive.
It has been argued that an exaggerated ToM also has costs
and can be maladaptive (Bru¨ne, 2001), as may be the case
in schizophrenia (Abu-Akel and Bailey, 2000; Frith, 2004).
Indeed, in humans, the ToM-module is apparently perma-
nently ‘online’ screening other persons, sometimes even
non-living objects, for their putative intentions. Therefore,
humans are always at risk of making false conjectures about
other people’s intentions or to anthropomorphize actions of
other beings or non-living events by assuming intentions
where in fact there are none (Bru¨ne, 2005). Whereas healthy
persons are able to reflect on the appropriateness and
correctness of these more or less automatic attributions,
patients with paranoid schizophrenia might over-attribute
significance and intentions to events, person and objects.
Thus, paranoid patients may be characterized by hyper-
intentionality. Abu-Akel and Bailey (2000) speak about
‘hyper ToM’, an attitude associated with quantitative over-
generation of hypotheses or over-attribution of mental
states. Paranoid patients seem to have an intact ToM in
the sense that they experience others as possessing mental
states, but they are impaired in using contextual information
inducing them to make incorrect ‘online’ inferences about
others (Bru¨ne, 2005). One promising way to understand
the nature of ToM deficits in schizophrenia is to investigate
the activation patterns of the ToM network with functional
neuroimaging.
To date, only few studies have investigated ToM tasks in
patients with schizophrenia using emotion labelling (Russell
et al., 2000), cartoons (Brunet et al., 2003; Bru¨ne et al.,
2008), and empathy and forgiveness judgements (Lee et al.,
2006). These studies yielded inconsistent results with hypo-
(Russel et al., 2000; Brunet et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2006) as
well as hyper-activation (Bru¨ne et al., 2008) of nodes of the
ToM network, in particular in the medial prefrontal cortex.
Moreover, three of these studies used less than 10 (5, 7 or 9)
subjects and none of them differentiated between different
types of intentional states.
Based on the idea that ToM is a function of the social
mind and that patients with schizophrenia are impaired in
social functioning, we were interested to investigate brain
activation in a homogeneous group with paranoid schizo-
phrenia for non-social and social ToM tasks with a validated
task (Walter et al., 2004; Ciaramidaro et al., 2007) using
three different types of intention (private intention, prospec-
tive social intention and communicative intention) and a
physical causation control condition. We hypothesized to
find a dysfunction in the mentalizing network in terms of
reduced brain activations in the intentional conditions, in
particular for communicative intentions (CInt), because
the schizophrenic patients’ attitude of ‘over-attributing’
intentions seems to be related to violations of pragmatic
rules in their use of language and incorrect inferences of
communicative intentions (Bru¨ne, 2005).
METHODS
Subjects
We studied 14 right-handed patients (seven females)
with paranoid schizophrenia according to ICD-10 (F 20.0)/
DSM-IV, recruited from among the inpatients treated at the
Department of Psychiatry at the University of Ulm, as well as
a matched control group (Table 1). Patients diagnosed with
concurrent axis I disorder according to DSM-IV criteria
were excluded from the study. In addition to a detailed
interview conducted by an experienced clinical psychiatrist
(N.V.), case notes were reviewed to corroborate the diagno-
sis of DSM-IV schizophrenia. Psychopathology was rated
by means of the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS)
(Overall and Gorham, 1976). In order to provide additional
information on negative symptoms (Andreasen et al., 2005),
the BPRS was complemented by the negative symptoms sub-
scale, as measured by the Positive and Negative Syndrome
Scale (PANSS) (Kay et al., 1989). To minimize cerebral
activation effects associated with poor performance, we
included only subjects with an accuracy clearly above
chance during performance of the fMRI activation task
(at least 60% correct responses, the chance level was 33%).
This criterion led us to the exclusion of two patients (one
female), and we included 12 subjects (six females) with mean
age 29.41 years (s.d. 5.96) in the functional analysis. The
healthy control group consisted of 12 right-handed
subjects (six females), mean age 24.75 years (s.d. 2.63).
Exclusion criteria for the control group were presence or
history of a neurological or psychiatric disorder, substance
abuse or dependence. The University of Ulm’s ethics
committee approved the study. Prior to scanning, written
informed consent was obtained from all subjects according
to the Declaration of Helsinki.
Experimental design
In our task, participants were asked to look at short comic
strips and then choose a picture that showed the only logical
Table 1 Demographic and clinical characteristics of the sample
Patients
(n¼ 12)
Mean (S.D.)
Control Subjects
(n¼ 12)
Mean (S.D.)
SZ versus C
P
Age (year) 29.5 (6.0] 24.75 (2.6) 0.02
Male/Female 6/6 6/6
Education (years) 12.4 (1.1] 12.3 (1.4) 0.73
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale
Positive 17.75 (5.06) –
Negative 19.41 (3.96) –
Total (positive, negative, general) 73.75 (11.02) –
Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale 47.18 (10.6) –
HAMD 12.18 (4.57) –
Years of Illness 6.3 (5.2) –
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story ending. Comic strips (examples available at www.
psych.unito.it/csc/pers/adenzato/pdf/intention_protocol.pdf)
pertained to the following experimental categories: (i) PInt:
Private intention. In this condition, participants represented
another person’s intention, based on observation of that
person’s isolated action, e.g. observing a single person (A)
changing a broken bulb in order to read a book; (ii) PSInt:
Prospective social intention (potentially shared in the
future). In this condition, participants represented another
person’s intention to socially interact with someone else in
the future, based on the observation of that person’s isolated
action, e.g. observing a single person (A) preparing a roman-
tic dinner for another person (B), who is not yet present in
the scenario; (iii) CInt: Communicative intention (shared in
the present). In this condition, participants represented the
intentions to communicate based on the observation of two
people interacting, e.g. observing a person (A) obtaining
a glass of water by asking another person (B) to get it for
her. The control condition was physical causality (Ph-C), in
which participants represented non-intentional causal links
among objects, e.g. a ball blown by a gust of wind knocking
over and breaking a glass of water.
We presented comic strips consisting of a sequence of
three pictures (the story-phase); each picture was displayed
for 3 s (Figure 1). The story phase was followed by a choice-
phase, during which three possible solutions were displayed
simultaneously for 7 s. Thus, one trial (one comic strip)
lasted 16 s (story-phase plus choice-phase). The participants’
task was to choose the logical story ending. Participants
indicated their choice by pressing one of three buttons as
quickly as possible. Only one picture represented the correct
answer. The two uncorrected pictures were constructed
according to the following principle: One foil picture
showed a possible, but illogical ending. The second foil
included the objects of the last scene rearranged physically
without containing a real action. We used a slow event-
related design with a relatively long inter-trial interval
(rest period) of 7–11 s (jittered) between trials. Eleven
comic strips were presented for each of the four conditions,
summing up to a total of 44 trials. The comic strips and the
visual location of the correct answer were presented in
pseudo randomized order. The experimental protocol was
administered in two sessions of 22 trials each. Before
scanning each participant received training with additional
comic strips for each category in order to verify that the
subject had clearly understood the instructions. During
scanning, participants wore luminescent crystal display
glasses (‘goggles’; Resonance Technologies, Northridge,
CA). Stimuli were presented with Presentation software
(Neurobehavioral Systems).
Behavioral data analysis. Participant reaction times and
response accuracy were measured during scanning. Data
were analyzed in a one-way ANOVA with subsequent
comparisons between means, using Bonferroni’s post hoc
test. Psychopathology of patients and controls was measured
using the BPRS and PANNS scale. To determine possible
relations between medication (chlorpromazine equivalent),
negative and positive schizophrenia symptoms according to
PANNS, and behavioural performance in the ToM task
(performance, reaction times) on the one hand and activa-
tion patterns on the other, we correlated the first eigenvari-
ate from the peak voxel of each significantly activated cluster
with the respective scores. Statistical analyses were carried
out using SPSS 11.5 for Windows.
fMRI data acquisition and analysis. fMRI data were
acquired using a 1.5 Tesla Siemens Magnetom Symphony
whole-body MRI System equipped with a head volume
coil. T2*-weighted functional MR images were obtained
using echo-planar imaging in an axial orientation. Image
size was 64 64 pixels, with a field of view of 192 mm.
One volume covering the whole brain consisted of 25 slices
with 4 mm slices thickness and a 1 mm gap. Time of
repetition (TR) was 2.250 s, echo time (TE) was 40 ms.
One session contained 257 volumes. The first four
volumes of each session were discarded in order to allow
for T2-equilibration. Data pre-processing and statistical
analysis were conducted with SPM 2 (Statistical Parametric
Mapping, Wellcome Institute of Cognitive Neurology,
London, UK) and MATLAB 6.3 (MathWorks, Natick,
Massachusetts, USA) using standardised procedures
Fig. 1 Activation paradigm, exemplarily shown for a trial of the CInt condition.
168 SCAN (2009) H.Walter et al.
(Friston et al., 1995). Individual functional images were
slice-timed and corrected for motion artefacts starting
from the fifth volume. Images were spatially normalized
(3 3 3 mm3) using sinc interpolation to the echo-
planar template of SPM in MNI space and spatially
smoothed with an 8 mm full width at half maximum iso-
tropic Gaussian kernel. The variance of each voxel was
estimated for each condition according to the general
linear model. Images were globally scaled; high frequency
noise was removed using a low pass filter (Gaussian kernel
with 4.0 s FWHM); and low frequency drifts were removed
via a high pass filter. Analyses were performed on two levels.
In a first-level analysis each subject was analysed sepa-
rately. Regressors were defined for story-phase and choice-
phase for each of the four conditions separately as box cars
convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response func-
tion implemented in SPM2. Realignment parameters were
included in the model. Contrast images for each condition
(Ph-C, PInt, PSInt and CInt) were calculated by using the
regressors for story and choice phases together. To account
for interindividual variance and in order to generalise
inferences (Holmes and Friston, 1998), we conducted a
second-level analysis.
For within-group comparisons we calculated an analyses
of variance (ANOVA) on the second level and contrasted
each of the intentional conditions (PInt, PSInt and CInt)
with the control condition (Ph-C). Group comparisons
between control subjects and patients with schizophrenia
were also computed using an ANOVA and we used the
same contrasts utilised in the within-group comparisons.
In order to exclude that the resulting activation was not
due to the different behavioural results (patients made more
errors and were slower than the control group, see also the
‘behavioural results’ section), we calculated three different
models for the group comparisons between control subjects
and patients with schizophrenia: Model 1: For single subject
(first level) analyses, all trials were included, i.e. correct
and incorrect (for control and patient group, respectively).
Model 2: For single subject (first level) analyses, only correct
trials were included, i.e. incorrect and omitted trials were
removed. These trials were pooled and used as individual
regressors of no interest for each subject. In this case, the
resulting model is composed of more trials for the control
group than for the patient group (remember that patients
made more errors). Model 3: For single-subject (first-level)
analyses, we included for the control group the same number
of correct trials as for the patients’ group. That means that
we had to exclude some trials of the control groups.
These trials were also pooled and used as individual regres-
sors of no interest for each subject. Both first and second-
level analyses were performed in exactly the same way for
Models 2 and 3 as in Model 1. As all regions included
a priori defined regions of interests (Walter et al., 2004;
Ciaramidaro et al., 2007) we chose an uncorrected threshold
of P< 0.001 at the voxel level, corrected for extent (P< 0.05)
at the cluster level (Forman et al., 1995). Anatomical regions
and denominations are reported according to the atlases
of Talairach and Tournoux (1988) and Duvernoy (1999).
Coordinates are maxima in a given cluster according to
the standard MNI-template.
RESULTS
Behavioral results
Analysis of reaction times in milliseconds (for correct
answers only) showed a main effect of group: Patients
were slower than the control group F(1,22)¼ 9.105,
P¼ 0.006 but there was no interaction between reaction
time and group [F(3,66)¼ 0.593, P¼ 0.62]. Similar results
were obtained for response accuracy: patients made more
errors than the control group [F(1,22)¼ 37.8, P< 0.0001]
but there was no interaction between condition and group
[F(3,66)¼ 0.39, P¼ 0.75]. Non-parametric direct compari-
sons between patients and control for each condition using
t-tests showed that patients were slower and made more
errors in each condition. T-tests for reaction time revealed
the following results: For PhC P¼ 0.026, for PInt P¼ 0.013,
for PSInt P¼ 0.011 and CInt P¼ 0.002; T-tests for accuracy
for all four comparisons P> 0.001.
Neuroimaging results
Main functional data analysis, including all performed
trials (Model 1). Separate random effects analyses of
activated regions comparing each experimental condition
(PInt, PSInt and CInt) with the control condition (Ph-C)
in schizophrenia patients and the control group showed
significant differences in activation patterns within and
between groups. The group activations of linear contrast
for controls and patients showed partially similar activation
patterns (see also Figure 2 and Table 2). However, there was
less activation in patients with schizophrenia in the posterior
cingulate cortex and bilateral TPJ, but nearly no activation
in medial prefrontal cortex.
Fig. 2 Main effects for the three experimental conditions (PInt, PSInt, CInt) versus
control condition (Ph-C) within-groups (Analysis of Model 1). Second level ANOVA,
P < 0.05 FDR corrected.
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Table 2 Coordinates and anatomical localization for the three experimental conditions (PInt, PSInt, CInt) versus control condition (Ph-C)
PInt PSInt CInt
Region BA x y z Z x y z Z x y z Z
Model 1: Control group
Precuneus 7 0 57 45 4.28a,b 0 63 30 5.57a,b 0 57 45 >8a,b
7 3 63 33 3.38a,b 0 57 42 5.48b
Cingulate gyrus 29/30 9 51 6 5.34b
Medial occipital gyrus 19/39 48 69 6 6.52a,b 48 75 6 5.19b
48 75 6 5.03b 51 75 6 7.67b
Superior temporal gyrus 22 48 57 12 7.05a,b 45 54 12 >8a,b 48 54 12 >8a,b
57 45 5 7.55a,b
Tempoparietal Junction 22 48 51 21 3.87a,b 48 57 21 >8a,b
42 57 21 4.88b 45 57 21 >8a,b
Medial temporal gyrus 21 48 36 3 7.55b
57 45 6 7.55b
Anterior temporal pole 21 51 9 18 5.42b 54 3 21 7.09b
54 6 21 5.01b 54 3 24 6.55b
Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 47 57 27 3 5.15b
47 48 30 12 6.08b
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 44/46 24 36 33 4.44b 27 36 33 5.52b
24 33 36 5.01b
Superior frontal sulcus 8 12 51 39 5.04b
15 51 39 6.53a,b
Paracingulate cortex 10/32 6 57 6 4.39b 3 57 27 6.98a,b
6 57 15 4.94a,b
Orbito frontal cortex 11 3 48 12 4.88a,b 0 45 21 6.51b
3 24 21 4.21b
Cerebellum 45 45 18 5.68 42 51 18 5.81b
Model 2: Control group
Precuneus 7 0 54 45 3.58 3 60 30 4.94b 3 57 30 7.80
0 54 42 4.34b
Cingulate gyrus 29/30 9 51 6 4.90
Medial occipital gyrus 19/39 51 69 6 4.72
48 75 6 3.59 48 75 9 3.90b 51 75 6 4.71
Superior temporal gyrus 22 51 39 12 5.53a,b 45 51 9 7.28a,b 54 39 12 7.47
51 45 6 5.04
Tempoparietal Junction 22 45 57 15 6.11a,b 51 57 21 7.10a,b 45 57 21 >8a,b
42 54 24 4.34b 45 57 21 7.53
Medial temporal gyrus 21 48 36 3 6.90
51 36 3 5.62
Anterior temporal pole 21 51 6 24 4.66b 57 3 21 7.09
54 3 24 4.24 57 0 21 7.08
Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 47 57 27 3 5.15b
47 48 30 12 6.08b
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 44/46 27 36 39 3.97 24 39 42 5.82b
24 45 42 4.54
Superior frontal sulcus 8 12 51 39 5.04
15 51 33 6.49
Paracingulate cortex 10/32 6 60 18 4.20b 6 60 21 7.09
Orbito frontal cortex 11 3 51 15 4.91b 0 51 15 6.41
3 33 21 4.03b
Cerebellum 45 42 21 3.80 45 45 18 4.25
Parahippocampal gyrus 24 27 21 4.21
Model 3: Control group
Precuneus 7 0 60 45 3.51 3 60 27 4.94b 0 60 33 7.31a,b
7
Cingulate gyrus 29/30 9 51 6 3.91b
continued
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FMRI analysisbetween group effects (Model 1).
ANOVA between groups comparing contrasts of interest in
controls and patients revealed significantly elevated activa-
tions only in the control group compared to the patient
group (Table 3) and not vice versa. They are shown in
Figure 3 and Table 3. As can been seen in Figure 3 the
contrast PInt versus Ph-C reveals no differences between
the two groups in nodes of the ToM network. In the contrast
PSInt versus Ph-C the right TPJ and MPFC were activated
significantly more in the control group and the contrast
CInt versus Ph-C indicates significant group differences
in the right and left TPJ and the MPFC.
Table 2 Continued
PInt PSInt CInt
Region BA x y z Z x y z Z x y z Z
Medial occipital gyrus 19/39 51 69 6 5.15a,b
48 75 9 3.85a,b 48 79 9 4.50b 51 69 12 4.59a,b
Superior temporal gyrus 22 45 54 9 6.50b 48 51 12 5.41a,b
57 45 12 4.12 57 45 3 5.89a,b
Tempoparietal Junction 22 48 60 18 6.35a 48 60 18 6.24a,b 48 60 24 6.63a,b
39 57 24 4.93b 51 57 21 6.55a,b
Medial temporal gyrus 21
57 42 3 5.89a,b
Anterior temporal pole 21 51 6 21 5.05b 54 3 21 5.34a,b
54 3 24 4.76b 54 3 24 5.32a,b
Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 47 54 30 9 3.85b
47 48 24 15 3.90b
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 44/46 27 36 42 3.99b 24 35 39 4.53b
27 35 33 3.98b
Superior frontal sulcus 8 15 42 48 3.98b
15 51 42 5.47b
Paracingulate cortex 10/32 6 51 12 4.55b 6 57 12 5.75b
6 57 12 3.80b
Orbito frontal cortex 11 3 36 21 3.93b 0 33 6 3.59a,b
6 24 18 3.91b
Cerebellum 45 48 18 4.93b
42 48 21 3.96b
Model 1: Patients group
Medial occipital gyrus 19 45 81 3 5.01a,b 45 81 0 5.09a,b
48 78 0 3.84b 48 81 0 4.11b 45 81 0 3.91b
Superior temporal gyrus 22 45 63 15 6.22a,b
57 54 12 4.40b
Tempoparietal Junction 45 63 18 5.38a,b 45 69 21 5.87a,b
Medial temporal gyrus 39
45 78 18 3.51b
Anterior temporal pole 21 57 9 15 3.88 57 9 18 4.63b
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 8/6 39 9 45 4.56b
Model 2 – 3: Patients groupa
Precuneus 7 0 63 33 3.91
Medial occipital gyrus 19 48 81 3 4.55b 45 81 0 3.82
48 81 0 3.23 45 78 15 3.54
Superior temporal gyrus 22 51 36 6 4.50
36 63 12 3.43 33 63 9 3.45
Tempoparietal Junction 22 42 63 21 3.61 45 69 21 4.15
Anterior temporal pole 21 57 12 18 4.73
53 9 18 3.41
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 8/6 27 21 36 3.79
Second level within-group ANOVA, P < 0.001 uncorrected, a¼ (p < 0.05 FWE corrected), b¼ (p < 0.05 FDR corrected).
x, y, and z are Talairach coordinates of the most significant centre of activation within a cluster; Z¼ z-value; BA¼ putative Brodmann Area.
Models 2 and 3 are identical for the patient group (patients made more errors). Only for the control group Models 2 and 3 are different.
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A clearer picture emerges if the mean activation sizes per
condition and group are plotted (compare Figure 4). Both
groups exhibit an increasing linear relationship in activation
in the right TPJ in the order Ph-C < PInt < PSInt < CInt. A
different trend can be noticed for the left TPJ and MPFC:
Whereas the control group also exhibited parametric activa-
tion in this region, the patient group showed positive beta
parameters for the Ph-C and for the CInt condition and
negative beta parameters that were similar for the PInt
and PSInt conditions.
Functional data analysis for Models 2 and 3. In
Model 2 (only correct trials) and in Model 3 (same
number of correct trials for controls and patient group) we
found results that are basically identical to the ones described
Table 3 Coordinates and anatomical localizations where healthy controls showed relatively more cerebral activation compared with paranoid patients for the
three experimental conditions (PInt, PSInt, CInt) versus control condition (Ph-C)
PInt* PSInt* CInt**
Region BA x y z Z x y z Z x y z Z
Model 1
Paracingulate cortex 10/32 3 57 12 4.26 15 57 21 4.48
3 57 9 4.14
Tempoparietal junction 22 45 54 9 4.26 45 54 24 3.82
48 48 24 4.55
Model 2
Precuneus 6 48 24 4.43
Paracingulate cortex 10/32 21 54 18 3.73
Tempoparietal junction 22
48 48 24 4.88
Model 3
Superior Frontal gyrus 10 18 54 18 4.24
18 48 39 4.31
Paracingulate cortex 10/32 9 57 9 4.21
6 57 9 4.02 6 57 9 3.12
Tempoparietal junction 22 45 54 9 4.26 48 51 9 3.56
48 48 21 3.49 48 48 24 4.23
Second level within-group ANOVA, P < 0.001 uncorrected, *for uncorrected extended cluster 19, **uncorrected, P < 0.05 at the cluster level.
x, y and z are Talairach coordinates of the most significant centre of activation within a cluster; Z¼ Z-value; BA¼ putative Brodmann Area.
Fig. 3 Regions in which healthy controls showed relatively more cerebral activation
compared with paranoid patients for the three experimental conditions (PInt, PSInt,
CInt) versus control condition (Ph-C). Second level ANOVA, P < 0.001 uncorrected,
P < 0.05 at the cluster level. For location within the MNI-template compare Figure 4. Fig. 4 Regions from Figure 3 shown in the MNI template.
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for Model 1 (more details in Table 3), i.e. the same within
group results and the same between group differences.
Therefore, we use and discuss only the results of Model 1.
For between group results of all three models see Table 3.
FMRI-correlations. We could not find any significant
correlations between brain activation patterns with medica-
tion (chlorpromazine equivalents), patients’ positive and
negative scores on the PANNS and BPRS scale or perfor-
mance and reaction times.
DISCUSSION
The present work aimed at investigating the dysfunction
of the ToM network in a homogenous group of patients
with paranoid schizophrenia and its modulation by different
intention types. We used a ToM task including three differ-
ent types of intention: PInt, PSInt and CInt. Confirming
our hypothesis, we found a dysfunction of the ToM network,
i.e. in the medial prefrontal cortex and the right and left
temporo-parietal cortex which was modulated by type of
intention. For communicative intentions all three regions
showed less differential activation in patients, for prospective
intentions only the right TPJ and the MPFC were less acti-
vated and for private intentions there were no group differ-
ences in activation. Furthermore, we found no signal drop in
the control condition (physical condition) relative to the
ToM conditions, consistent with the Hyper-ToM hypothesis
of schizophrenia.
Behavioural impairments in patients with paranoid
schizophrenia
As hypothesized the patient group showed lower accuracy
and increased reaction times compared to the control group.
However, reduced performance was observed in all four
conditions, i.e. also the control condition (Ph-C). Brunet
et al. (2003) using a ToM task similar to ours, reported
similar results, i.e. reduced performance in ToM as well as
the control task. One could argue that this result reflects
unspecific impairments in the patient group. However, an
alternative explanation can be provided which interprets
these findings as a consequence of the patients exhibiting
‘hyper-ToM’. ‘Hyper-ToM’ leads these patients to attribute
intentions and goals to objects, i.e. treating things like
persons.
General impairment of neural mechanisms
supporting ToM
The task used elicited strong activation in healthy controls in
the typical ToM network as in previous studies (Walter et al.,
2004). Although patients also showed activation in parts
of this network for CInt, the group comparison revealed
significantly less activation in the three main ToM regions,
namely the MPFC as well the bilateral TPJ (compare
Figure 2, Table 2).
As reduced overall performance might influence neuro-
imaging results we performed three types of analyses as
outlined in the methods sections, incorporating either all
trials (Model 1), correct trials only (Model 2) or exactly
the same number of correct trials in both groups
(Model 3). The results of these analyses did not change
our main findings. Therefore, we argue that it is justified
to assume that the group differences for different conditions
we describe in the next section are explained by the specific
type of process induced rather than by task difficulty.
Our results are consistent with findings by Brunet et al.
(2003) using a similar cartoon paradigm who also found less
activation in the right MPFC in patients with schizophrenia.
However, as we will discuss below, the study by Brunet et al.
(2003) mixed the types of intentions which might explain
why they could not demonstrate hypoactivation of the TPJ.
Our data also fit with the findings of Lee et al. (2006) who
found less activation of the left MPFC in patients with schi-
zophrenia in the acute phase compared to activations after
remission. Similar findings have been described by
Marjoram et al. (2006) comparing high risk subjects with
and without psychotic symptoms. In a very recent study by
Bru¨ne et al. (2008) however, increased activation of dor-
somedial areas, left TPJ and right temporal cortex were
found in patients with schizophrenia compared to controls.
In that particular study patients with passivity symptoms
were investigated which in general are least impaired in
ToM tasks. Furthermore, the task used by these authors
did not show a robust activation of the ToM network in
controls, in particular healthy controls showed no activation
of the medial prefrontal cortex, perhaps due to the fact
that activation and control task were very similar.
Neural dysfunction of the ToM network is modulated
by type of intention
One strength of our paradigm is that it allows to investigate
group differences for different types of intentions. For the
private intention condition (PInt), representing the most
simple ToM condition, we found no group differences.
Therefore, on the neural level, patients with schizophrenia
present no neural dysfunction for this type of ToM task.
Instead, during PSInt, significant group differences in the
right TPJ and the MPFC were revealed. Although both pri-
vate intentions (PInt) and prospective intentions (PSInt)
share a common element, namely, a single agent acting in
isolation, only PSInt requires the representation of a social
goal. Also in CInt, the second and more complex social
intention involving two people interacting, there was an
additional group difference in activation in the left TPJ
(together with the right TPJ and the MPFC).
How can we understand these group differences which are
restricted to social intentions only? Our results show that as
soon as social interaction is involved (present or foreseen)
neural differences in activation become apparent. This is true
for the most basic structure of the ToM network, namely the
right TPJ (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe and Wexler,
2005). Significant group differences are also found in the
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medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC). It has been argued that the
MPFC serves the purpose of decoupling mental states from
their environment (Leslie, 1987; Bru¨ne, 2005; Brunet-Gouet
and Decety, 2006). This function helps subjects to distin-
guish clearly between what is happening in the outer world
and the inner world. That is especially important in under-
standing social intentions in which observing subjects have
to distinguish between intentions of others and their own as
in PSInt and CInt. Patients with schizophrenia show an aber-
rant pattern of activation for social intentions probably
because they are not able of decoupling and have problems
distinguishing between intentions of others interacting and
their own, resulting in misattributions.
In the CInt condition group differences were most
pronounced and incorporated additionally the left TPJ
(Figure 3). The left TPJ has been shown to be specifically
activated for communicative intentions (Walter et al., 2004;
Ciaramidaro et al., 2007). We propose that this specific
activation is based on the role of the left hemisphere in
language processing. It has been pointed out that ToM
deficits in schizophrenia might explain some of the com-
munication problems that patients with schizophrenia have
(Frith, 2004). Paranoid schizophrenic patients make signifi-
cantly more mistakes on tasks that involve inferring the
beliefs and intentions of the speakers (Tenyi et al., 2002).
In line with this reasoning, Langdon et al. (2002), using a
picture-sequence task, have demonstrated pragmatic deficits
of expressive language and pragmatic deficits of comprehen-
sion. Bru¨ne et al. (2005) propose that overattribution of
intentions is related to incorrect use of pragmatic rules in
their use of language.
Hyper-ToM for physical events?
Interestingly, our data reveal further information related to
the control condition, i.e. representing physical causality
Fig. 5 Mean activation effects (estimated beta parameters, 95% confidence interval) of the contrast Cint vs PhC for right TPJ, MPFC and left TPJ. The activation effects were
extracted from the second level between-group ANOVA, P < 0.001 uncorrected, P < 0.05 at the cluster level. Red: Healthy control subjects; Blue: Paranoid patients. Dashed circles
indicate the beta parameters for the control condition (Ph-C).
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without any intentions (Ph-C). Looking at the beta para-
meters in Figure 4, it is obvious that the lack of activation
in the MPFC for the contrast CInt vs. Ph-C is not only due
to decreased activation in this region in the CInt condition,
but also to relatively increased beta values in the Ph-C con-
dition. In accordance with the above-mentioned hypothesis
that paranoid patients may have a hyperactive intention
detector, we can explain our results tentatively as follows:
Paranoid patients do not deactivate their intention detector
when they are solving stories involving physical causality
but these patients are always in an ‘online’ modus of ToM.
This would also be the case in contexts without intentional
agents, where no ToM is required. Blakemore et al. (2003)
reported that patients with delusions of persecution attrib-
uted intentional behaviour to moving shapes in conditions
where controls saw no intentionality. These authors propose
that patients with schizophrenia perceive agency where
others see none. The same process took place when our
patient group observed Ph-C stories. An exaggerated sense
of agency seems to characterize patients with delusions of
persecution, and this tendency to perceive agency where
there is none may be a more general feature of schizophrenia
(Frith, 2005). This could be the reason why our patients
make as many errors in the Ph-C conditions as in the
ToM conditions: One may speculate that these patients do
not properly recognise the difference between stories invol-
ving an intentional agent from stories without an agent:
Moving objects are processed as possessing intentional
agency.
Also the beta parameters for the left TPJ (Figure 5)
showed a similar trend as in the MPFC: We observed an
increasing activation in the CInt condition for the patients
group (like in the healthy group) but also in the Ph-C con-
dition (in the opposite direction as the healthy group).
We speculate that the relative increase in the left TPJ and
MPFC for the Ph-C condition suggests that the patient
group attributes communicative intentions to the objects
present in this scenario (all the Ph-C comic strips contain
two or more objects involved in physical causality).
Therefore, an important conclusion from our data is that
the missing differential activation might result partly from
a dysfunction during physical causality attribution and not
only from a dysfunction during the attribution of social
intentions.
Our proposal is that the ToM-module in patients with
paranoid schizophrenia might malfunction because it is
overactive from the start and thus is not well suited to
distinguish properly between mental and physical states.
Hence, we agree with the idea of ‘hyper ToM’ as proposed
by Abu-Akel and Bailey (2000): ‘An attitude to associate with
quantitative overgeneration of hypotheses or overattribution
of mental states’ also when ToM is not demanded.
Our study has several limitations. First, we studied only
one subgroup of patients with schizophrenia, namely para-
noid schizophrenia. The relatively small number of patients
might also explain why we were not able to demonstrate
correlations with psychopathology. It would be helpful to
investigate different subtypes of schizophrenia in future
studies, in particular disorganized patients. Secondly, we
did not include an exhaustive behavioural battery of ToM
tasks which might allow interpreting our results in relation
to behavioural findings. Thirdly, we have incorporated
only patients that were medicated so that we cannot defi-
nitely exclude medication effects. However, as our findings
were not general but specific to certain conditions within the
patient group our results are unlikely to be explained only by
medication.
CONCLUSION
In summary, we have demonstrated that different parts of
the ToM network are differentially affected in understanding
the social domain in relation to the type of intention
involved. Whereas we found no group differences for private
intentions, group differences emerged for social intentions,
namely reduced differential activation for prospective inten-
tions in the right TPJ and the MPFC and, for communicative
intentions additionally in the left TPJ. We provide evidence
that the dysfunction in the intentional network is partially
mediated by an intention detector which became hyper-
active in the paranoid interpretation of the physical world.
Our results clearly demonstrate that findings of dysfunc-
tional activation within the ToM network can only be inter-
preted properly if the type of mental state or intention which
is used to solve the task is taken into account. Furthermore,
our results provide evidence that the dispute about the true
mentalizing structure within the brain might be a misnomer:
Different structures might be relevant for different types of
intentional states. Regarding the social and communicative
aspects of ToM tasks we have provided evidence that the
MPFC and the left TPJ play the most important role.
This might stimulate research in different ways. First, it
would be valuable to use private and communicative
intentions in order to study subtypes of schizophrenia
e.g. disorganized versus negative symptoms versus positive
symptoms. Second, our results point to the necessity to look
also at the control condition used in ToM tasks, especially
in patients with positive symptoms which might have a
hyperactive intention detector already for physical events.
REFERENCES
Abu-Akel, A., Bailey, A.L. (2000). The possibility of different forms of
theory of mind. Psychological Medicine, 30, 735–738.
Amodio, D.M., Frith, C.D. (2006). Meeting of minds: The medial frontal
cortex and social cognition. Nature Review of Neuroscience, 7, 268–277.
Andreasen, N.C., Carpenter, W.T., Jr, Kane, J.M., Lasser, R.A., Marder, S.R.,
Weinberger, D.R. (2005). Remission in schizophrenia: Proposed
criteria and rationale for consensus. American Journal of Psychiatry,
162, 441–449.
Apperly, I.A., Samson, D., Chiavarino, C., Humphreys, G.W. (2004).
Frontal and temporo-parietal lobe contributions to theory of mind:
Neuropsychological evidence from a false-belief task with reduced
FMRI of social intentions in schizophrenia SCAN (2009) 175
language and executive demands. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 16,
1773–1784.
Baron-Cohen S. (1995). Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory
of Mind: Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Blakemore, S.J., Boyer, P., Pachot-Clouard, M., Meltzoff, A., Segebarth, C.,
Decety, J. (2003). The detection of contingency and animacy from
simple animations in the human brain. Cerebral Cortex, 13, 837–844.
Brothers, L. (1990). The social brain: A project for integrating
primate behaviour and neurophysiology in a new domain. Concepts
Neuroscience, 1, 27–51.
Bru¨ne, M. (2001). Social cognition and psychopathology in an evolutionary
perspective. Current status and proposals for research. Psychopathology,
34, 85–94.
Bru¨ne, M. (2005). ‘‘Theory of mind’’ in schizophrenia: A review of the
literature. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 31, 21–42.
Bru¨ne, M., Lissek, S., Fuchs, N., et al. (2008). An fMRI study of
theory of mind in schizophrenic patients with ‘‘passivity’’ symptoms.
Neuropsychologia.
Brunet-Gouet, E., Decety, J. (2006). Social brain dysfunctions in schizo-
phrenia: A review of neuroimaging studies. Psychiatry Research, 148,
75–92.
Brunet, E., Sarfati, Y., Hardy-Bayle, M.C., Decety, J. (2003). Abnormalities
of brain function during a nonverbal theory of mind task in schizophre-
nia. Neuropsychologia, 41, 1574–1582.
Ciaramidaro, A., Adenzato, M., Enrici, I., et al. (2007). The intentional
network: How the brain reads varieties of intentions. Neuropsychologia,
45, 3105–3113.
Corcoran, R., Cahill, C., Frith, C.D. (1997). The appreciation of visual jokes
in people with schizophrenia: A study of ’mentalizing’ ability.
Schizophrenia Research, 24, 319–327.
Dunbar, R.I.M. (1998). The social brain hypothesis. Evolutionary anthro-
pology. Evolutionary Anthropology, 6, 178–190.
Duvernoy, H.M. (1999). The Human Brain. Springer, Wien.
Forman, S.D., Cohen, J.D., Fitzgerald, M., Eddy, W.F., Mintun, M.A.,
Noll, D.C. (1995). Improved assessment of significant activation in func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI): use of cluster-size threshold.
Magnetic Resonance Medicine, 33, 636–647.
Frith C.D. (1992). The Cognitive Neuropsychology of Schizophrenia. Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates Ltd., Hove.
Frith, C.D. (2005). The self in action: Lessons from delusions of control.
Conscious Cognitive, 14, 752–770.
Frith, C.D. (2004). Schizophrenia and theory of mind. Psychology Medicine,
34, 385–389.
Frith, C.D., Frith, U. (2006). The neural basis of mentalizing. Neuron, 50,
531–534.
Gallagher, H.L., Frith, C.D. (2003). Functional imaging of ’theory of mind’.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 77–83.
Gregory, C., Lough, S., Stone, V., et al. (2002). Theory of mind
in patients with frontal variant frontotemporal dementia and
Alzheimer’s disease: Theoretical and practical implications. Brain, 125,
752–764.
Hynes, C.A., Baird, A.A., Grafton, S.T. (2006). Differential role of the orbital
frontal lobe in emotional versus cognitive perspective-taking.
Neuropsychologia, 44, 374–383.
Kay, S.R., Opler, L.A., Lindenmayer, J.P. (1989). The Positive and Negative
Syndrome Scale (PANSS): Rationale and standardisation. British Journal
of Psychiatry Supplement, 59–67.
Langdon, R., Coltheart, M., Ward, P.B., Catts, S.V. (2002). Disturbed com-
munication in schizophrenia: The role of poor pragmatics and poor
mind-reading. Psychology. Medicine, 32, 1273–1284.
Lee, K.H., Brown, W.H., Egleston, P.N., et al. (2006). A functional magnetic
resonance imaging study of social cognition in schizophrenia during an
acute episode and after recovery. American Journal of Psychiatry, 163,
1926–1933.
Leslie, A.M. (1987). Pretence and representation: The origins of ‘theory of
mind. Psychological Review, 94, 412–426.
Marjoram, D., Job, D.E., Whalley, H.C., et al. (2006). A visual joke fMRI
investigation into Theory of Mind and enhanced risk of schizophrenia.
Neuroimage, 31, 1850–1858.
Overall, J.E., Gorham, D.R. (1976). In: Guy, W., editor, BPRS. Brief
Psychiatric Rating Scale. ECDEU, Assessment Manual for Psycho-
pharmacology, Rockville: National Insitute of Mental Health, pp. 157–169.
Pickup, G.J., Frith, C.D. (2001). Theory of mind impairments in schizo-
phrenia: Symptomatology, severity and specificity. Psychology Medicine,
31, 207–220.
Premack, D., Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of
mind? Behaviour & Brain Science, 1, 515–526.
Rowe, J.B., Passingham, R.E. (2001). Working memory for location and
time: Activity in prefrontal area 46 relates to selection rather than
maintenance in memory. Neuroimage, 14, 77–86.
Russell, T.A., Rubia, K., Bullmore, E.T., et al. (2000). Exploring the social
brain in schizophrenia: Left prefrontal underactivation during mental
state attribution. American Journal of Psychiatry, 157, 2040–2042.
Saxe, R. (2006). Uniquely human social cognition. Current Opinion
Neurobiology, 16, 235–239.
Saxe, R., Kanwisher, N. (2003). People thinking about thinking people. The
role of the temporo-parietal junction in ‘‘theory of mind’’. Neuroimage,
19, 1835–1842.
Saxe, R., Wexler, A. (2005). Making sense of another mind: The role of the
right temporo-parietal junction. Neuropsychologia, 43, 1391–1399.
Sprong, M., Schothorst, P., Vos, E., Hox, J., van Engeland, H. (2007).
Theory of mind in schizophrenia: Meta-analysis. British Journal of
Psychiatry, 191, 5–13.
Stone, V.E., Baron-Cohen, S., Calder, A., Keane, J., Young, A. (2003).
Acquired theory of mind impairments in individuals with bilateral amyg-
dala lesions. Neuropsychologia, 41, 209–220.
Stuss, D.T., Gallup, G.G., Jr, Alexander, M.P. (2001). The frontal lobes are
necessary for ‘theory of mind’. Brain, 124, 279–286.
Talairach J., Tournoux P. (1988). Coplanar Stereotaxic Atlas of the Human
Brain. Thieme, Stuttgart.
Tenyi, T., Herold, R., Szili, I.M., Trixler, M. (2002). Schizophrenics show a
failure in the decoding of violations of conversational implicatures.
Psychopathology, 35, 25–27.
Walter, H., Adenzato, M., Ciaramidaro, A., Enrici, I., Pia, L., Bara, B.G.
(2004). Understanding intentions in social interaction: The role of the
anterior paracingulate cortex. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 16,
1854–1863.
176 SCAN (2009) H.Walter et al.
